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2	Jeanette E. McPherson, Nevada Bar No. 5423 SCHWARTZER & MCPHERSON LAW FIRM
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5	E-Mail: <u>bkfilings@s-mlaw.com</u>
6	Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession

Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

In re:	Cas
USA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,	Cas
Debtor	Cas
In re:	Cas
USA CAPITAL REALTY ADVISORS, LLC,	Cas
Debtor	
In re:	- Cha
USA CAPITAL DIVERSIFIED TRUST DEED	Join
FUND, LLC,	Cas
Debtor	
In re:	
USA CAPITAL FIRST TRUST DEED FUND,	
LLC,	RE
Debtor	
In re:	OB
USA SECURITIES, LLC,	OR
Debtor	
Affects:	HC TR
☑ All Debtors	AL
☐ USA Commercial Mortgage Company	AL
☐ USA Capital Realty Advisors, LLC	
☐ USA Capital Diversified Trust Deed Fund, LLC	
☐ USA Capital First Trust Deed Fund, LLC	Dat
☐ USA Securities, LLC	Tin

se No. BK-S-06-10725 LBR se No. BK-S-06-10726 LBR se No. BK-S-06-10727 LBR se No. BK-S-06-10728 LBR se No. BK-S-06-10729 LBR

E-FILED ON NOVEMBER 7, 2006

apter 11

ntly Administered Under se No. BK-S-06-10725 LBR

SPONSE OF SCHWARTZER & CPHERSON LAW FIRM TO SJECTION TO ITS INTERIM FEE RDER FILED BY THE MMITTEE FOR EQUITY OLDERS OF USA CAPITAL FIRST UST DEED FUND, LLC (AFFECTS L DEBTORS)

te: September 28, 2006

ne: 9:30 a.m.

The Schwartzer & McPherson Law Firm (the "Firm"), attorneys for the "Debtors" hereby files this Response to the objection to the Firm's proposed first interim fee order (the "Order") filed by the Official Committee of Equity Holders of USA Capital First Trust Deed Fund, LLC (the "Objection"). In support of its Response, the Firm respectfully states as follows:

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1. The Objection disputes the proposed allocation of fees and expenses to USA
Capital First Trust Deed Fund, LLC (the "First Fund") and states that the Firm should allocate, on
an interim basis 9.5% of its fees incurred in <i>all the cases</i> to First Fund. 1 The Firm asserts (a) that
its allocation to First Fund of 9% of the fees and costs previously allocated to USA Capital
Commercial Mortgage, Inc. ("USACM") is appropriate (or, possibly, an underestimate) and (b)
the difference is immaterial for a temporary allocation. In the original application, the Firm
allocated 91.6% of its fees and expenses to USACM. The balance of its fees and expenses were
identified as being related to services for particular Debtors and allocated among the other estates.
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to this allocation. At the hearing, Ms.
McPherson said, "[w]ith regard to the allocation issue, we do believe our allocation that we have
made is appropriate; however, we have also agreed to the temporary allocation of the fees that we
have allocated to Commercial Mortgage, so that it's 80/10/10, and I'll go back and look at those
fees again" (page 7, lines 14-18 of transcript of hearing). There was no further comment on the
allocation issue in this part of the hearing. See partial transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "1."

- 2. There are several alternatives the Court may consider:
- The proposed Order took 9% of the fees previously allocated to USACM a. (\$244,438) and reallocated them to First Fund. Adding the 9% (\$21,199.42) to the amounts previously identified as fees for services solely for the benefit of First Fund (\$11,300) resulted in a fee allocation to First Fund of \$33,291.46.
- If we took 10% of the fees previously allocated to USACM (\$24,443) and b. reallocated them to First fund, the result would be a fee allocation to First Fund of \$35,743.
- If we took 9.5% of the total fees allowed in the jointly administered cases (\$265,016) and allocated them to First Fund, the result would be a fee allocation to First Fund of \$25,176.52.
- d. If we took 10% of the total fees allowed in the jointly administered cases and allocated them to First Fund, the result would be a fee allocation to First Fund of \$26,501.

¹ The wording in the Objection is "an amount not to exceed 9.5% of the fees sought by the debtors' professionals in the first interim fee application."

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In addition, reimbursement of allowed costs in the amount of \$5,465.09 should be allocated in the same manner as the fees.

These alternatives all stay within the parameters of the almost made agreement of the parties. However, the Court, in its discretion could consider other alternatives. It is questionable whether dealing with the very active First Fund Committee's counsel has only resulted in a 9.5% increase in fees and costs in this case. A 25% allocation (based upon there being four Official Committees) would be more appropriate. An alternative would be to allocate the fees in proportion to the fees generated by each of the counsel for the four Official Committees on the assumption that the more work performed by a Committee's counsel generates more work for Debtors' counsel.

Using the allocation pro rata based on the number of Committees, the allocation a. would be:

(i) USACM (2 Committees)	\$132,508
(ii) First Fund (1 Committee)	\$66,254

\$66,254

b. Using the allocation based on the amount of attorneys' fees incurred by the various

Committees for each entity, the allocation would be:

(iii) Diversified Fund (1 Committee)

(i) USACM (\$485,637/\$1,751,689x\$265,016)	\$73,473
(ii) First Fund (\$723,926/\$1,751,689x\$265,016)	\$109,524
(iii) Diversified Fund (\$542,126/\$1,751,689x\$265,016)	\$82,019

3. Based on the hearing transcript, there is a question of whether the 80/10/10 allocation was meant to apply to the total fees in the joint cases or only to the fees then allocated to USACM. Counsel for the Debtors intended one allocation method, counsel for the First Fund Committee meant another. Counsel for the Debtors intended that the 80/10/10 allocation would be made from the fees allocated to USACM because (a) Debtors' counsel had already made its own allocation to each Debtor, i.e., fees had already been allocated to First Fund and Diversified Fund for work that was solely related to those entities and (b) the 80/10/10 allocation was made at the

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request of counsel for the USACM Unsecured Creditors Committee based upon that Committee's belief that too much of the fees had been allocated to USACXM.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Joint administration is designed in large part to promote procedural convenience and cost efficiencies which do not affect the substantive rights of claimants or the respective debtor estates. Unsecured Creditors Committee v. Leavitt Structural Tubing Co., 55 B.R. 710 (N.D.III.1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 477 (7th Cir.1986).

In re McKenzie Energy Corp., 228 B.R. 854, 874 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 1998).

The purpose of joint administration is to make case administration easier and less expensive than in separate cases, without affecting the substantive rights of creditors (including inter-debtor claims). There is no merging of assets and liabilities of the debtors, and inter-entity claims survive. Creditors of each debtor continue to look to that debtor for payment of their claims. The respective debtors are required to maintain separate banking and accounting records. Any professionals appointed in more than one related case must keep separate time and expense records, and must make separate applications for employment and for compensation.

In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd., 89 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1988).

Even though three cases were administratively consolidated ("joint administration"), "[a]ny professionals appointed in more than one related case must keep separate time and expense records, and must make separate applications for employment and for compensation." In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd., 89 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988). "The purpose of joint administration is to make case administration easier and less expensive than in separate cases, without affecting the substantive rights of creditors (including inter-debtor claims). There is no merging of assets and liabilities of the debtors ...". *Id*.

Matter of Hutter Const. Co., Inc., 126 B.R. 1005, 1012 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. 1991).

The Court's decision to approve joint administration was based on the expected savings of administrative fees and costs. These savings are only possible by having one set of restructuring personnel and attorneys even in the face of possible inter-company claims. In re BH & P, Inc., 949 F.2d 1300, 1312 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("Considering the advantages of joint administration and the place for single trustees in that process, we are not prepared to say that interdebtor claims mandate disqualification of the trustee in every instance."). See also In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., Inc., 189 B.R. 874, 881 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Finally, we note that representation of a creditor and a debtor in the same case is not by itself a basis to deny fees under

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SCHWARTZER & MCPHERSON LAW FIRM

11 U.S.C. § 328(c). As set forth above, 11 U.S.C. § 327(c), which is incorporated into 11 U.S.C. § 328(c), provides that "a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there is an objection by another creditor or the United States trustee, in which case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual conflict of interest.").

CONCLUSION

A majority of the Firm's efforts in these cases has involved matters common to the three estates (USACM, First Fund and Diversified Fund).² This joint approach to administration has saved an enormous amount of duplication of effort and expense to these three estates. In situations where expenses of administration have not been clearly applicable to one estate, the Firm allocated the fees of such USACM. All of the out of pocket expenses were also allocated to USACM. By using this approach to allocation, the Firm probably allocated all of the cost savings of joint administration to First Fund and Diversified Fund. A reallocation would be appropriate. The Firm attempted to do this by allocating 10% of USACM fees to First Fund and 10% to Diversified Fund.

There is no dispute that the Court approved legal fees in the amount of \$265,016,00 and reimbursement for costs expended in the amount of \$5,465.09 for a total of \$270,481.09 for the period April 13, 2006 through July 31, 2006, and authorized the Debtors to pay the fees and costs allowed the Schwartzer & McPherson Law Firm. From the Firm's point of view, there is no conflict because each of these three Debtors has (or will have) the ability to pay administrative

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² USA Capital Realty Advisors, LLC and USA Securities, LLC have few assets, no operations and few, if any, creditors other than investors who may claim mismanagement or misrepresentation. SM's Reply To Objections To Proposed Order 110706 - 5 -

Case 06-10725-gwz Doc 1748 Entered 11/07/06 12:28:13 Page 6 of 49

	1	expenses. The question of allocation is le	eft to the Court in the absence of a meeting of the minds
	2	by the parties.	
	3	DATED: November 7, 2006	
	4		Respectfully submitted by
	5		
	6		/s/ Jeanette E. McPherson Lenard E. Schwartzer, Esq.
	7		Jeanette E. McPherson, Esq.
	8		Schwartzer & McPherson Law Firm 2850 South Jones Blvd., Suite 1
	9		Las Vegas NV 89146 Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession
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/s/ Jeanette E. McPherson	

SCHWARTZER & MCPHERSON LAW FIRM 2850 South Jones Boulevard, Suite 1 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146-5308 Tel: (702) 228-7590 · Fax: (702) 892-0122

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
2	1. On November 7, 2006 I served the following document(s):
3	a. RESPONSE OF SCHWARTZER & MCPHERSON LAW FIRM TO OBJECTION TO
4	ITS INTERIM FEE ORDER FILED BY THE COMMITTEE FOR EQUITY HOLDERS OF USA CAPITAL FIRST TRUST DEED FUND, LLC (AFFECTS ALL DEBTORS)
5	2. I served the above-named document(s) by the following means to the persons as listed
6	below:
7	☑ a. <u>By ECF System</u> :
8	FRANKLIN C. ADAMS franklin.adams@bbklaw.com, arthur.johnston@bbklaw.com
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11	FRANK A. ANDERSON anderson.frank@pbgc.gov, efile@pbgc.gov
12	OGONNA M. ATAMOH oatamoh@nevadafirm.com, bkecf@nevadafirm.com;paltstatt@nevadafirm.com;sliberio@nevadafirm.com
13	•
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EXHIBIT "1"

```
1
                     UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
                           DISTRICT OF NEVADA
 2
                            LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
      In re: USA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE
                                             SEPTEMBER 28, 2006
      COMPANY,
 3
                                             E-Filed: 11/01/06
                                          )
 4
                Debtor.
                                             Case No.
                                             BK-S-06-10725-LBR
 5
                                             Chapter 11
      USA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,
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                Plaintiff,
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                                             Adversary No.
           VS.
 8
                                             06-01146-LBR
      WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,
 9
                Defendants.
10
      USA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,
11
                Plaintiff,
12
           VS.
                                             Adversary No.
13
                                             06-01179-LBR
      STANDARD PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT,
14
      LLC,
                Defendant.
15
      USA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,
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                Plaintiff,
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                                             Adversary No.
           VS.
18
                                             06-01167-LBR
      ROBERT J. KEHL, et al.,
19
                Defendants.
20
                    PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
21
         (06-01146) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE RE: COMPLAINT, NO. 10
2.2
                                    AND
                  MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY, NO. 1159
23
                                    AND
                  INTERIM APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
                  FOR SHLOMO S. SHERMAN, ESQ., NO. 1232
24
                                    AND
25
      Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording;
      transcript produced by transcription service.
```

1	MOTION FOR AN ORDER
_	PURSUANT TO 11, USC, SECTIONS 105(A), 327(A), AND 331
2	AUTHORIZING RETENTION OF PROFESSIONALS UTILIZED BY DEBTORS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS, NO. 1205
3	AND INTERIM APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
4	FOR STUTMAN, TREISTER & GLATT, P.C., NO. 1232
5	INTERIM APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION FOR ALVAREZ & MARSAL, LLC, NO. 1232
6	AND
7	INTERIM APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION, NO. 1249 AND
	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
8	FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006, FOR ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP, NO. 1232
9	AND
	APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
10	FOR GORDON & SILVER, LTD., NO. 1220 AND
11	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
	FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 9, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006,
12	FOR BECKLEY SINGLETON, CHTD., NO. 1232 AND
13	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
	AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES FOR,
14	(1), MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC, AS CRISIS MANAGERS FOR THE DEBTORS
15	AND, (2), THOMAS J. ALLISON
10	OF MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC,
16	AS CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER FOR THE DEBTORS
	AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
17	FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 14, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006,
18	FOR MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC, NO. 1232 AND
10	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
19	AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
	FOR LEWIS AND ROCA, LLP, NO. 1232
20	AND
0.1	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
21	AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES FROM APRIL 14, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006,
22	FOR SCHWARTZER & McPHERSON LAW FIRM, NO. 1232
22	AND
23	FIRST APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
	PURSUANT TO 11, USC, SECTIONS 330 AND 331
24	FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 13, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006,
2.5	FOR RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C., NO. 1232
25	AND

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1
       MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
                  FOR ITS DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN
 2
          AND TO FREEZE THE PLAN EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 30, 2006,
                                NO. 1236
 3
                                   AND
               FIRST INTERIM APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION
            FOR OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF EQUITY SECURITY HOLDERS
 4
               OF USA CAPITAL FIRST TRUST DEED FUND, LLC,
      FOR THE PERIOD MAY 10, 2006 THROUGH JULY 31, 2006, NO. 1241
 5
                                   AND
           (06-01179) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, NO. 5
 6
                                   AND
 7
               ORDER SHORTENING TIME RE: MOTION TO COMPEL
            CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE OF MEMBER LIST, NO. 1346
 8
                                   AND
                 APPLICATION TO EMPLOY THOMAS J. ALLISON
 9
             AND MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC,
           AS CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER AND CRISIS MANAGERS
               AND DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING,
10
                    (1), THE EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION
11
              OF MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC,
                   AS CRISIS MANAGERS FOR THE DEBTORS,
             AND, (2), THE DESIGNATION OF THOMAS J. ALLISON
12
              OF MESIROW FINANCIAL INTERIM MANAGEMENT, LLC,
             AS CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER FOR THE DEBTORS
13
       AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, NO. 6
14
                                   AND
                 (06-01167) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
15
            AND FOR ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS, NO. 97
                                   AND
16
          APPLICATION TO EMPLOY SCHWARTZER & McPHERSON LAW FIRM
                AS COUNSEL UNDER GENERAL RETAINER, NO. 21
17
                                   AND
           APPLICATION TO EMPLOY RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.,
18
                    AS COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR, NO. 23
19
          MOTION TO REJECT PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASES, NO. 1131
                                VOLUME 1
20
                  BEFORE THE HONORABLE LINDA B. RIEGLE
                     UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
21
                      Thursday, September 28, 2006
22
                                9:30 a.m.
23
     Court Recorder:
24
                               Helen C. Smith
25
      Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording;
      transcript produced by transcription service.
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ĺ		
1	APPEARANCES (Cont.)	
2	For the Unsecured Creditors Committee	SUSAN M. FREEMAN, ESQ.
3	of USA Commercial Mortgage Company and Lewis and Roca, LLP:	40 North Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85004
4		
5		
6	For Standard Property Development, LLC:	Stephens, Gourley & Bywater, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive
7		Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
8	For Individual Direct Lenders:	DUSTIN A. JOHNSON, ESQ. Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright
10		801 South Rancho Drive Suite D-4
11		Las Vegas, Nevada 89106
	For Group of Direct Lenders, the Alexander Group, and Several Defendants:	NANCY L. ALLF, ESQ.
12 13		Parson, Behle & Latimer 411 East Bonneville Avenue Suite 300
14		Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
15		ROBERT C. LePOME, ESQ. Law Offices of Robert C. LePome
16		330 South Third Street 1100-B Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
17		
18	For Mesirow Financial Interim Management, LLC:	F. CHRISTOPHER AUSTIN, ESQ. Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway
19	TTT (•	Suite 500 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
20		NANCY A. PETERMAN, ESQ.
21		Greenberg Traurig, LLP 77 West Wacker Drive
22		Suite 2500 Chicago, Illinois 60601
23		
24	For the Jones Vargas Direct Lenders, Kehl Family Group,	JANET L. CHUBB, ESQ. Jones Vargas 100 West Liberty
25	and Several Others:	Twelfth Floor Reno, Nevada 89501

1	APPEARANCES (Cont.)	
2	For the Direct	GERALD M. GORDON, ESQ.
3	Lenders Committee:	GREGORY E. GARMAN, ESQ. Gordon & Silver, Ltd.
4		3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Ninth Floor
5		Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
6	For Phillip N. Ralston, and Benita M. Ralston, Trustees Ralston	VICTORIA L. NELSON, ESQ. Santoro, Driggs, Walch, Kearney, Johnson & Thompson
7	Family Trust, and Dina Ladd:	400 South Fourth Street Third Floor
8		Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
9	For Joseph Milanowski and Thomas Hantges:	RUSSELL S. WALKER, ESQ. Woodbury, P.C.
10	and inomas nameges.	265 East 100 South Suite 300
11		Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
12	For Larson & Stephens and James Feeney:	ZACHARIAH LARSON, ESQ. Larson & Stephens
13		425 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
14	For Peter A. Bolino,	JOHN J. LAXAGUE, ESQ.
15	Fabiola A. Bolino,	Cane Clark, LLP 3273 East Warm Springs Road
16	and Marie T. Mallin, Trustees Mallin Family	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
17	Trust, Custodian for George J. Motto IRA,	
18	Daniel Drubin, Laura Drubin,	
19	and Beverly J. Stiles:	
20	For Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.:	JEFFREY R. HALL, ESQ. Shea & Carlyon, Ltd.
21	14 • 17 • •	233 South Fourth Street Suite 200
22		Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
23	For the United States	AUGUST B. LANDIS, ESQ.
24	Trustee:	Office of the United States Trustee 300 Las Vegas Boulevard South
25		Suite 4300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

```
1
           (Court previously convened at 09:44:25 a.m.)
 2
           (Partial transcript at 12:27:54 p.m.)
 3
                THE COURT: Okay. The Schwartzer McPherson.
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
 4
 5
                MS. McPHERSON: Your Honor, this is our first
      application for fees in the amount of $265,016, costs of
 6
 7
     $5,465.09.
 8
           In light of the amount of time spent, the four months,
 9
     and the fact that we're representing five debtors, we
10
     believe this amount is reasonable.
11
           It's reasonable in light of that representation, the
12
     amount of time, and also reasonable in light of the other
13
     professionals' fees and costs in this case.
14
           With regard to the allocation issue, we do believe our
15
     allocation that we have made is appropriate; however, we
16
     have also agreed to the temporary allocation of the fees
17
     that we have allocated to Commercial Mortgage, so that it's
18
     80/10/10, and I'll go back and look at those fees again.
19
           Some of our time has been spent representing Commercial
20
     Mortgage in litigation, so it really does clearly belong to
21
     Commercial Mortgage.
22
           With regard to the objections, we too have received an
23
     objection from the U.S. Trustee's Office, and we have tried
24
     to work out those issues with the U.S. Trustee and just have
25
     not come to a resolution.
```

2.2

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The U.S. Trustee has first noted or stated that we only provided Mr. Schwartzer's rate in the employment application.
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We did provide the other rates in the declaration to that employment application which provides for the rates of other lawyers in the firm and for paralegals.

The next objection is to clerical issues. The objection is specifically to Mr. Schwartzer's time spent talking with Clark Fenneran (phonetic) and rescheduling the IDI (phonetic). Point two hours was spent on that.

We feel that that time was de minimus and in light of the fact that it probably got done much quicker with Mr. Schwartzer talking to Mr. Fenneran and the fact that, you know, the U.S. Trustee's Office often needs to talk to a lawyer and actually make sure the debtor can appear and have the debtor's representative there, so we don't believe that objection is appropriate.

And, also, an objection is made to point 3 hours that Mr. Schwartzer reviewed a newspaper article. We believe that time is appropriate.

In this case, we have investors calling. We need to know what information that they have read, and Mr. Schwartzer has attended meetings with investors, so we believe that time was spent appropriately because he needs to be aware of what has been published about the case.

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The next objection is to lumping of time in the total amount of 4.9 hours. With regard to this lumping issue, it's similar to Ms. Jarvis in that the time that was entered it may appear to be lumping; however, it is time that all relates to one topic. For instance, 1.9 hours was objected to on June 9th where the time entered states work on DIP financing and then a semicolon, E-mails regarding OST. That's all relating to the DIP-financing motion. The next entry is 2.3 hours on the same date, June 9th, 2006, work on professional-payment protocol, E-mails re OST, research, add legal authority. That all relates to the professional-payment protocol application. The other objection to lumping is 1.2 hours on May 10th. The entry is review letter from J. Jorgenson (phonetic) at Wells Fargo Bank, research issues, draft letter to C. Carlyon, counsel for Wells Fargo, regarding the collection account, E-mailed a client, review comments. Again, that's all related to the Wells Fargo issue. Now,

the --

THE COURT: Now, on the Wells Fargo before I get,
I don't see any application for fees in the Wells Fargo case
for your attorneys fees. Do you intend to apply for that
because you asked for it in the prayer?

MR. SCHWARTZER: Your Honor, Mr. Huston is special

```
1
     counsel in the interpleader action, and what happened is he
 2
     was not aware of the deadline for getting the application in
 3
     for today's hearing, but he would be covered by the
 4
     interim --
 5
               THE COURT: But I meant --
 6
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- protocol.
 7
               THE COURT: -- your fees. You're billing for the
 8
     Wells Fargo action.
 9
               MS. McPHERSON: Yes.
10
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Yes.
11
               MS. McPHERSON: Yes, your Honor. We have put it
12
     in our application.
13
               THE COURT: No. My point is --
14
               MS. McPHERSON: Oh.
15
               THE COURT: -- why did -- all right. In the
16
     interpleader, asking in the interpleader for your fees.
17
     You're entitled --
18
               MS. McPHERSON: You know, in --
19
               THE COURT: You --
20
               MS. McPHERSON: In the --
21
               THE COURT: The complaint asked for your attorneys
2.2
     fees.
23
               MS. McPHERSON: Yeah. Other than in the prayer?
24
               THE COURT: Right.
25
               MS. McPHERSON: Wait.
```

```
1
               THE COURT: No. It's in the prayer, and that's
2
     it, but nobody has done anything to -- usually, in an
 3
     interpleader, you make your motion for summary judgment and
 4
     get your fees in the beginning.
 5
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Right now, I'm not representing
     the debtor --
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Okay.
 8
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- in that. Mr. Huston will, and
 9
     I think that's a very good idea that we will provide him
10
     with a list of our fees that were incurred with regard to
11
     the interpleader. So when he --
12
                THE COURT: And I quess --
13
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- does that motion, it will ask
14
     for those funds.
15
               THE COURT: Now, you know, I don't want to
16
     predetermine it, but the point is you had asked for it in
17
     the prayer, and I guess, you know, I think under the regular
18
     statutes you might be entitled to it. But at least,
     there's --
19
20
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Yes.
21
               MS. McPHERSON: Okay.
2.2
               THE COURT: -- an option there.
23
               MS. McPHERSON: Your Honor, we'll take care --
24
               THE COURT: And I quess --
25
               MS. McPHERSON: -- of that.
```

```
1
                THE COURT: -- I'm questioning, too, if Mr. Huston
 2
     is doing this case is why does your firm have so much time
 3
     on both of those litigation matters.
 4
                MR. SCHWARTZER: Well, first of all, there was a
 5
     point in time when we hadn't made the decision that we were
 6
     going to hire special counsel for that purpose.
 7
          With the issue that was just -- the question that was
 8
      just made, that had to do with keeping the collection
 9
     account open at Wells Fargo --
10
                THE COURT:
                            Oh.
                MR. SCHWARTZER: -- for an additional period of
11
12
     time because it took awhile before the new accounts were
13
     opened at Bank of America, and we didn't want the
14
     Wells Fargo account --
15
                THE COURT: Okay.
16
                MR. SCHWARTZER: -- closed because some borrowers
17
     might still only have the wiring instructions to the
18
     Wells Fargo account.
19
                THE COURT: Okay.
20
                MR. SCHWARTZER: And that was accomplished, and
21
     now the account is closed.
2.2
                THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm sorry. Okay. And on
23
     the other litigation matter, what -- I thought I had your
24
     application out here, so I'm going to have to remember my
25
     notes on that, but the --
```

```
1
               MS. McPHERSON: The Wells --
                THE COURT: The other litigation matter that
 2
 3
     Mr. Huston is --
 4
               MS. McPHERSON: He --
 5
                THE COURT: There was a fair amount of time billed
     on that. So if --
 6
 7
               MS. McPHERSON: What --
 8
                THE COURT: -- independent counsel is doing that,
 9
     why is your firm billing?
10
                MS. McPHERSON: Well --
11
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Your Honor --
12
                MS. McPHERSON: Yeah.
13
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- again, to answer that
14
     question, what we did is when we -- that action was to
15
     recover $100,000 that was paid out postpetition --
16
                THE COURT: Uh-huh.
17
                MR. SCHWARTZER: -- on a check. We considered
18
     that a separate matter, but then we realized because it was
19
     paid out of the investor account which is the account that's
20
     their matter of dispute of the interpleader action --
21
     really, the money only comes into these divided up in the
2.2
     interpleader action.
23
          We decided it made more sense to consolidate the two
24
     actions, have Mr. Huston handle it all, and we did file, and
25
     I think it was at the last omnibus hearing the Court granted
```

```
1
     the motion to consolidate.
 2
                THE COURT: Okay.
 3
                MR. SCHWARTZER: And that's why, but we started
 4
     that -- actually, that action started before the
 5
      interpleader action --
 6
                THE COURT: Oh, okay.
 7
                MR. SCHWARTZER: -- had been started.
 8
                THE COURT: All right.
 9
               MS. McPHERSON: Your Honor, that Wells Fargo
10
     action was filed about a month before the interpleader
11
     action, and they have been consolidated.
12
          With regard to the interpleader action, we did initiate
13
      it, discovered one of the defendants is another debtor
14
     entity.
15
                THE COURT: Okay.
               MS. McPHERSON: And that's why we stepped out at
16
17
     that point, and then they have been consolidated.
18
          The last objected-to entry is dated from April 20th for
19
     2.6 hours. The entry is work on motions to limit notice,
20
     work on motion to extend time to file schedules, and employ
21
     BMC, and those do appear to be lumped.
22
          However, we believe in light of the amount of time
23
     involved that it really is insignificant, and that it can be
24
     really determined how much time was spent.
25
          The next objection is to charges that the U.S.
```

2.2

Trustee's Office says are for nonlegal services. On

June 15th, Mr. Schwartzer entered in time of 2.1 hours for
assisting in filing the schedules. That really should be
more appropriately called reviewing the schedules that were
to be filed.

You'll recall that that's when the amendments were filed, and they were quite massive, and they were coming in on that day.

So those objections to fees total \$3,187. We don't believe the objection is appropriate, and that we have appropriately responded to any requests that need to be addressed.

The next objections are to expenses billed. We have an objection to delivery charges of \$267.50. Our firm does not have an in-house runner. We use an outside service, and we do not make money off of the delivery charges.

We pay a flat fee, and then we allocate it based on the runs that are made, and we have determined that \$5 is appropriate, and we essentially break even at that point.

We'd also like to note that with regard to these delivery charges we always put them in our fee applications. They have been granted in the past, and other firms do in the community.

And the U.S. Trustee's Office has not objected to other fee applications that also contain these delivery charges of

either that amount or more.

And while we did have the opportunity to object to those fees as the U.S. Trustee's Office has pointed out, we don't believe they're unreasonable, and that's why we didn't object.

But we do want some consistency on these objections, and we believe that if one firm gets paid for delivery charges all of the firms have to be paid for delivery charges of similar amounts.

We've got an objection to the bill for a conference room of \$1,198. We have submitted the invoice to that. It was money spent on a conference room for everybody to get together and meet, and those were the actual charges.

The last objection to the expenses is for Westlaw, \$1,452.42. We think this amount is reasonable for the four months that we have been working on this case.

But, also, I want to note that the firm has a contract with Westlaw. We charge based on that special-pricing contract. If we charged outside of that contract, the estate would have been billed \$14,000, so this is not a --

THE COURT: But isn't there an invoice that they print that shows you all the charges that you can -- I guess they're saying there's no invoice or a charge, so they can't tell.

MS. McPHERSON: We have provided them with

```
1
     information showing that we used Westlaw for USA.
 2
     because it's a special-pricing contract, you can't allocate
 3
     a specific amount --
 4
               THE COURT: They don't make you --
 5
               MS. McPHERSON: -- to the --
 6
               THE COURT: -- type in client and all of that when
 7
     you get into it?
 8
               MS. McPHERSON: Yes. Yes. We type in client, and
 9
     that way if you stay within your plan which we usually do
10
     it's part of your flat fee, and then it's up to the firm to
     allocate it to all of the clients who had research.
11
12
                THE COURT: Okay. So have they seen your
13
     allocation, seen the bill on the allocation?
14
               MS. McPHERSON: Yes.
15
               THE COURT: Okay.
16
               MS. McPHERSON: The last objection is to PACER
17
     charges, $1,565.05, and the contention is, well, you get it
18
     for free, and so where is the charge coming from.
19
          We do get the documents coming to us, and we get one
20
     free look for ten days is my understanding. But because of
21
     the amount of pleadings in this case, we do not print off
2.2
     everything nor do we download. It would have just been --
23
     it's just too taxing on our system.
24
               THE COURT: Can you look at it from BMC? I mean,
25
     you were paying for it a different way, but that doesn't
```

```
1
      increase --
 2
               MS. McPHERSON: We try to use --
 3
               THE COURT: -- the BMC charge.
               MS. McPHERSON: -- BMC and also the U.S. Capital
 4
 5
     Corp. Web site. However, if we need to make sure that the
 6
     information is accurate, we do go to PACER to make sure that
 7
     we're looking at the official docket.
 8
          And, also, with regard to this PACER amount, when we do
 9
     have to copy these documents, we do charge our copy rate, so
10
     we have put that in there.
11
               THE COURT: Oh, you charge a copy rate as opposed
12
     to what PACER charged you?
13
               MS. McPHERSON: No. No, no. It's the PACER
14
     charge --
15
               THE COURT: Oh, okay. So this PACER --
16
               MS. McPHERSON: -- plus the --
17
               THE COURT: -- charge is exactly what PACER has
18
     charged you, what you've paid the court.
19
               MS. McPHERSON: It's 8 cents when we have to print
20
     it off. And when we have to download it, it's 8 cents per
21
     page and, you know, capped.
2.2
          But, also, if we print it off, then we do charge a copy
23
     charge because that would be a normal copy charge. It's
24
     just if you were running through the copy machine.
25
               THE COURT: Well, I can go to Costco and get the
```

```
1
     paper pretty cheap, I mean, so I don't know. And of this
 2
     PACER charge, how much of that -- I mean, we're such small
 3
     potatoes, but there's a principle involved. How much did
 4
     PACER actually charge you?
               MS. McPHERSON: Your Honor, we would have to
 5
 6
     actually go and calculate --
 7
               THE COURT: Okay. So this charge --
 8
               MS. McPHERSON: -- that amount.
 9
               THE COURT: -- includes your 8 cents a copy plus
10
     what PACER charged you.
11
               MS. McPHERSON: Not in all instances. Just --
12
               THE COURT: Okay.
13
               MS. McPHERSON: Just when if there is a print
14
     charge when it was actually printed off, so we would
15
     actually have to go through. I requested that information.
16
               THE COURT: Okay.
17
               MS. McPHERSON: But it is a very long --
18
               THE COURT: Okay.
19
               MS. McPHERSON: -- process to determine the actual
20
     amount.
21
               THE COURT: Okay.
22
               MS. McPHERSON: And in light of the amount, it
     wasn't worth the --
23
24
               THE COURT: Yeah. No.
25
               MS. McPHERSON: Okay.
```

```
1
               THE COURT: Exactly. Okay.
 2
          Mr. Landis.
 3
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Oh, your --
               THE COURT: Oh, sorry.
 4
 5
               MR. SCHWARTZER: Your Honor, I just wanted to add
 6
     one thing that I (indiscernible). Because we're handling
 7
     some of the outside nonbankruptcy litigation, for example,
 8
     there's litigation in the U.S. District Court in Reno where
 9
     USA is a participant, some of these PACER charges -- and we
10
     haven't done the allocation -- is based upon getting
11
     documents from cases that are not the bankruptcy case, and
12
     we don't get those --
13
               THE COURT: Right.
14
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- even in the first instance for
15
     free. We have to go on-line with the U.S. District Court --
16
               THE COURT: Um-h'm.
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- and get it. For example, in
17
18
     the two cases, there's the Weddell litigation that is
19
     pending in district court. They made a motion to lift stay
20
     here. I felt it was appropriate for me to review the
21
     pleadings in that case.
2.2
          And to do that, I had to get -- I went on PACER because
23
     that's usually the fastest way of getting access to those
24
     kinds of documents, and we didn't allocate it separately
25
     from the --
```

```
1
                THE COURT: Um-h'm.
 2
               MR. SCHWARTZER: -- bankruptcy.
 3
                MS. McPHERSON: And most of those documents are
 4
     quite voluminous --
 5
                THE COURT: Right.
 6
               MS. McPHERSON: -- in the litigation.
 7
                THE COURT: Okay.
 8
          Mr. Landis.
 9
               MR. LANDIS: You're right. It's not large
10
     dollars, but there is a principle that we're required --
11
                THE COURT: You know what I would suggest --
12
                MR. LANDIS: -- to uphold.
13
                THE COURT: -- in this regard? This sounds like
14
     we need a U.S. Trustee's Office guideline in this regard
15
     just like we used to do on copies because it's an issue I
16
     never even thought about, and we need to make it the same
17
     for everybody.
18
          And on one hand, you want to say just charge for PACER,
19
     but let me just say this. I think it's appropriate that any
20
     copy you download even though you get it for free the point
21
     is you can only get it so long, so I have no problem with
2.2
     whatever the actual PACER charges are. Even if they could
23
     get it for free, they get it.
24
           The next question is how much should you allow for
25
     printing the page out in your firm. You know, like at
```

```
1
     25 cents, I don't think so.
 2
          But, you know, there is some cost involved with the
 3
     paper and the machinery and the printer because we all
 4
      like -- that's the problem here. We have to print
 5
     everything.
 6
          That's why I make you guys print this stuff out because
 7
     the court doesn't have enough money for paper and printers,
 8
     so there is some costs.
 9
           So this is such small potatoes, but I think this is
10
     something good the U.S. Trustee's Office overall might look
     at is now that we have a PACER society what is a fair charge
11
12
     for everybody to charge for these kinds of things.
13
                MR. LANDIS: And, your Honor, you know, there are
14
     a couple of things you need to be careful about, and one is
15
     not awarding bad practices.
16
           It's not just free for ten days, and you can download
     it and save the PDF. You may not ever need to print it.
17
18
     But if you need to go back and look at it, you don't then
19
     have to incur the 8-cents-per-page charge through PACER.
20
     You simply go on your own system and look at it.
21
          Now, I'm cognizant that we got 1300-plus docket entries
2.2
     in this case.
23
                THE COURT: Oh, yeah. By the way --
24
               MR. LANDIS: I --
25
                THE COURT: -- we're up to 1400 today.
```

2.2

MR. LANDIS: 1400 now? Oh, all right. You know, if we wait a little longer, it will click up another, but the fact of the matter remains this.

You don't download every single certificate of service.

You don't download docket entries. You don't download

matters that aren't of significance to you as a litigant in
these cases.

When you do see something of substance, and you know it's likely to come back, then you should download it and save it in PDF format. Then if you actually need to print it, if you have a copy charge, that's a different matter.

Here is what we're faced with regarding PACER. We didn't know what the actual charge was, number one. Number two, we couldn't understand and still don't why it can't be handled for free, and then last but not least there are other available sources for these that don't cost money. Especially, matters of substance are posted as the Court noted on the BMC Web site, and so forth.

So we need to be careful not to give carte blanche to in this case and every other situation that there is going to be an acknowledged agreed amount that we can just accept in PACER. We ought to encourage good practices with respect to the use of that system which is invaluable.

And we recognize that as a practical matter you're going to have to go back and look at the docket to see when

```
1
     something was filed, but that doesn't mean that you then
     need to open up to view the document if you can
 2
 3
     simply read --
 4
                THE COURT: Well, in fairness --
 5
                MR. LANDIS: -- the list.
 6
                THE COURT: -- though, in the old days, you would
 7
     have automatically have had a paper copy to put in your file
 8
     because somebody would have served you with it.
 9
               MR. LANDIS: That was then. This is now, Judge.
10
               THE COURT: I know.
11
               MR. LANDIS: I can't arque --
12
                THE COURT: But the point is --
13
                MR. LANDIS: -- that point.
14
                THE COURT: -- you're cutting out the cost of
15
     copying, and you would have had that, and, you know, hey, I
16
     guess I am a troglodyte.
17
          But, you know, you just can't read these things by
18
     looking on-line, and you're going to have to print them out
19
     sometime. I mean, you're right. Maybe you don't -- well,
20
     even certificates of mailing.
21
           The reason we have those is so that somebody can go
22
     back and see was this thing served right. I mean, that's
23
     really important in this case.
24
                MR. LANDIS: Then you can look at the docket and
25
     see, and --
```

```
1
               THE COURT: Oh, yeah, all 1400 entries. But if
 2
     you've got, you know, when --
 3
               MR. LANDIS: Well, but if you know when it was
 4
     served, you can narrow the search on CM/ECF. You know that,
 5
     too, Judge.
 6
               THE COURT: Yeah. But --
 7
               MR. LANDIS: And you can at least narrow it to
 8
     say --
 9
                THE COURT: I'm not so sure that I want to
10
     interfere with somebody's good case management. If somebody
11
     wants to -- it seems to me a reasonable way to manage a case
12
     is to take every piece of paper and file it like you used to
13
     with a good paralegal and like the appropriate motions.
14
          Another way is to do it on your computer. That's kind
15
     of case management, but the bottom line is we're spending
16
     more arguing about this with all the attorneys in here than
17
     this is worth.
18
               MR. LANDIS: The --
19
               THE COURT: I think the answer is I would like
20
     your office to come up with some protocol maybe in this case
21
     and then, you know, really for all over.
22
          What are other districts doing? I mean, it's a
23
     reasonable issue. We now have PACER in place. We now have
24
     electronic filing in place. It's a reasonable issue.
25
          I'm going to go ahead and allow it for now. Oh, I do
```

```
1
     want an invoice, though, to see how much you charged and
 2
     then an explanation, subject to an explanation of why you
 3
     charged what you charged.
 4
                MR. LANDIS: And going back through the
 5
     discussion, then, Judge, we do have Westlaw, and they have
 6
     yesterday provided us with the Westlaw charges.
 7
          My concern is is that this is overhead, Judge. It's a
 8
     flat fee that they have for an amount of service, and
 9
     they're now trying to allocate it among various cases.
10
           That I think under Gingy (phonetic) and the other cases
     that have addressed the difference between overhead and
11
12
     actual cost in a case --
13
                THE COURT: Well, gee --
14
               MR. LANDIS: -- have suggested this --
15
                THE COURT: -- unfortunately, Gingy was written in
16
     the days since I've been here so long --
17
               MR. LANDIS: I know.
                THE COURT: -- before we had Westlaw as a common
18
19
     practice.
20
                MR. LANDIS: It --
21
                THE COURT: I mean, Westlaw was new.
2.2
               MR. LANDIS: Yeah.
                THE COURT: I mean, the old idea was you don't
23
24
     allocate for the libraries and whatever, and we did allow --
25
     Westlaw has always been allowed.
```

```
1
          So it doesn't make sense to say, all right, so you can
2
     charge for -- you've got to charge on the billing rate which
 3
     makes it twice as high as if you did it conservatively and
 4
      just did it an overhead rate.
 5
               MR. LANDIS: Well, your Honor, the real question
     is whether it's even compensable at all as overheard versus
 6
 7
     whether it's attributable to this particular case.
 8
               THE COURT: Well, if you --
 9
               MR. LANDIS: We --
10
               THE COURT: -- you want to spend the legal
11
     research time (indiscernible) whether Westlaw is compensable
12
     in this case, we're going to (indiscernible) on a lot of
13
     fees.
14
               MR. LANDIS: We want to raise the issue because
15
     it. --
16
               THE COURT: I'm not doing --
17
               MR. LANDIS: -- has to be raised.
18
               THE COURT: -- the research.
19
               MR. LANDIS: All right. Fair enough, your Honor,
20
     but the fact is is that we'll raise the issue now and deal
21
     with it when it comes up again.
22
               THE COURT: Well, no. I mean, the point is if you
23
     want to raise the issue -- now, I'm not saying it's not a
24
     legitimate issue. I'm just saying we got to keep
25
     perspective in this case.
```

```
1
               MR. LANDIS: I understand, your Honor.
 2
                THE COURT:
                            And, also, in light of the fact that
 3
     the U.S. Trustee's Office quidelines haven't really I don't
 4
     think adequately dealt with this issue, I think before --
 5
     you know, if you want to make policy for the United States
 6
     and what happens with Westlaw, so be it.
 7
          And there is certainly a legitimate issue, but is it
 8
     appropriate to do it here as opposed to giving some
     consideration about what should be done either on a national
 9
10
     level and a local level. That's my --
                MR. LANDIS: I --
11
12
                THE COURT: -- comment.
13
                MR. LANDIS: I get the point, your Honor, and
14
     we'll appreciate, actually, the invitation for additional
15
     information, and I'll address it at an appropriate level.
16
           I can guarantee you that I don't make policy for the
17
     Office of the United States Trustee. I can also assure you
18
     that I believe that there is some pretty specific case law
19
     in addition to Gingy at the Ninth Circuit level that makes
20
     the distinction between what is overhead and what is, in
21
     fact, an allocable cost in a particular case.
2.2
           It strikes me that if Westlaw is a flat free, and there
23
     is an effort to allocate it to this particular case that
24
     takes it out of --
25
                THE COURT: But do we --
```

```
1
               MR. LANDIS: -- kind of --
 2
               THE COURT: -- really want them to change their
 3
     contract, so that they now pay on a per-cost basis?
 4
               MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, I --
 5
               THE COURT: You go on-line, and you do it that
 6
     way.
 7
               MR. LANDIS: I deal --
 8
               THE COURT: Do we really want to encourage that?
 9
               MR. LANDIS: I deal with the facts as they're
10
     brought to me --
11
               THE COURT: No, no.
12
               MR. LANDIS: -- in a case.
13
               THE COURT: But I'm serious. Do you really want
14
     to deal -- I mean, you're right. You're looking at the law
15
     perspective. Do you really want to do that?
16
               MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, the fact of the matter is
17
     when the issue is presented as to whether an expense in a
18
     case albeit a relatively-minor sum --
19
               THE COURT: Right. But the --
20
               MR. LANDIS: -- it is --
21
               THE COURT: -- U.S. Trustee --
22
               MR. LANDIS: -- compensable or not as an
23
     expense --
24
               THE COURT: Well --
25
               MR. LANDIS: In order for it to be compensated, it
```

```
1
     has to not be overhead.
 2
                THE COURT: Right.
 3
                MR. LANDIS: That's my point --
                THE COURT: Um-h'm.
 4
 5
                MR. LANDIS: -- your Honor.
 6
                THE COURT:
                            Sure. But the U.S. Trustee guidelines
 7
     are not done in a vacuum nor are our fee-applications
 8
     quideline.
 9
           It was easy in the old days to say a library was
10
     overhead because you had to have this set of books
11
     regardless.
12
           Now, with electronic research, you look at a specific
13
      issue, and you are charged for a specific amount of time
14
     unless you have a contract which will make it cheaper. Now,
15
     it would certainly -- and is that overhead or is it not
16
     overhead?
17
           But it seems to me unfair to say if a person wants to
18
     charge per research on every project, so they know they get
19
     paid, and it costs everybody more is that really what you
20
     want to encourage as opposed to people using flat rates.
21
                MR. LANDIS: I don't know that I'm going to
22
     establish policy in this dialog with the Court in this case.
23
     I understand and appreciate the concerns that you're
24
     addressing.
25
           I'm faced with just an application on these
```

```
1
     particular --
 2
                THE COURT: Okay.
 3
                MR. LANDIS: -- sets of facts, and what I'm
 4
      suggesting to you is what we saw on our review --
 5
                THE COURT: Sure.
 6
               MR. LANDIS: -- indicates that it, in fact, is
 7
     overhead, therefore, not compensable under existing
 8
     Ninth Circuit law, not so much the guidelines. That was the
 9
     reason for the objection, your Honor.
10
          With respect to -- I just want to move quickly through
     this --
11
12
                THE COURT: Um-h'm.
13
                MR. LANDIS: -- because it is not a huge sum.
14
     With respect to the conference room, we have an invoice.
15
     understand that now.
16
          Delivery charges, that is a flat fee that they have
17
     arranged. That is within the scope of Gingy. That is
18
     overhead for purposes of our objection.
19
          With respect to the fees objection, I think we've got
20
     some explanation here now. The question is whether or not
21
     it's sufficient. That's up to the Court to decide based on
2.2
     your review of their application.
23
          You have based on our summary only about -- what are we
24
     talking about here -- seven hours, so it's not a huge amount
25
     of money, but it is something that requires the Court's
```

```
1
     consideration.
 2
           The total fees objected to are $3,187. We believe that
 3
     the objection is viable based on the analysis that we have
 4
     put together.
 5
           And, Judge, for purposes of this hearing also and your
 6
     ease of review if you choose, we have prepared a similar
 7
     summary, a timekeeper summary, to what we did in a more
 8
     voluminous way in Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.
 9
           If I can approach?
10
                THE COURT: Okay. But we just have this one
11
     thing, right, two-tenths of an hour?
12
                MR. LANDIS: There is clerical, there is lumping,
13
     and there is nonlegal services.
14
                THE COURT: Okay.
15
                MR. LANDIS: And I have broken them down for you
16
     by detail.
17
                THE COURT: Okay.
18
                MR. LANDIS: So if you want to use it to compare
19
     it, it basically will help you do it --
20
                THE COURT: Okay.
                MR. LANDIS: -- more quickly.
21
22
           If I can approach?
23
                THE COURT: Um-h'm.
24
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
25
                THE COURT: Okay.
```

```
1
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
 2
               MR. LANDIS: Again, Judge, this is simply a
 3
     summary of the items that we objected to based on the fee
 4
     application.
 5
          As a summary, we believe it's admissible under
     Rule 1009. We would move to have it admitted for
 6
 7
     purposes --
 8
                THE COURT: Okay.
 9
               MR. LANDIS: -- of today's hearing.
10
               THE COURT: It's admitted.
11
               MR. LANDIS: Last but not least, Judge, you were
12
     talking about having fees for Schwartzer & McPherson allowed
13
     in connection with the interpleader action. I'm very
14
     concerned about that.
15
          There is a special counsel that has been appointed to
16
     serve in the interpleader action, and there is a reason for
17
     that.
18
          The reason for that is there is a conflict for the
19
     Schwartzer & McPherson Law Firm. They ought not be getting
20
     paid in connection with the interpleader action. I'm
21
     concerned that the Court not lose track of that fact.
2.2
     Mr. Huston exists because of the conflict.
          And last but not least in connection with our objection
23
24
     that wasn't addressed is we want to make certain that if
25
     these fees are allowed at any amount that it's on an interim
```

```
1
     basis and without prejudice to our continuing objection
 2
     regarding the conflict question.
 3
               THE COURT: Okay.
 4
               MR. LANDIS: Thank you, your Honor.
 5
                THE COURT: All right. I'm going to allow the
 6
      fees. Again, as everybody knows in any case, these are all
 7
     interim fees.
 8
          On the clerical issues, though, I will overrule that
 9
     objection. Arguably, the clerical person could have talked
10
     to Mr. Fenneran, but it would have required Mr. Schwartzer
     saying please give Mr. Fenneran a call.
11
12
          And then the person would have responded back saying
13
     Mr. Fenneran said X, so I don't think it would have saved
14
     any time, two-tenths of an hour. Also, I think Mr. Fenneran
15
     deserves to be talked to by the attorney.
16
           I mean, the news article, at first, that hits you in
17
     the face, but, boy, you're absolutely right. I mean, you
18
     know, in the media coverage of this, it's important to know
19
     whether or not how it's being covered, is it being covered
```

Lumping, the explanation of these, I certainly appreciate you bringing the issue to my attention. The key to my mind is can I tell what happened, and I think with those explanations — and I understand it required further explanation.

20

21

22

23

24

25

correctly.

2.2

With those explanations, I can understand what's happening. I can understand what tasks it should be billed to, so that to me is sufficient.

Again, everybody keep in mind that to try and avoid that nonlegal. With the explanation that it was reviewing the schedules, I'll allow that.

Now, on these expenses, I think the way to deal with this is I'll temporarily allow them. I think the U.S. Trustee's Office should make overall a list of what you believe is overhead and not overhead in the context of this case that would be applicable to all the professionals, so that we treat all the professionals alike.

And that if we have to have briefing at the end of the case we can have one set of attorneys write one set of briefs and resolve the issue and because they're certainly legitimate issues, you know, and they do add up, and they're important issues to bring up, but we must'nt lose perspective.

And I think it would be good for your office to sit down and take a look at in the changing world what is or is not, and then that gives the attorneys the time to talk with you and talk among themselves, so that's allowed.

But, again, all objections are preserved, but, specifically, that objection is preserved, and we'll deal with that if necessary at I guess probably the final

```
1
     hearings.
 2
           So everybody need to keep in mind that that's going to
 3
     be one of the issues they're raising as to all of you,
 4
     PACER, Westlaw, delivery charges. All right.
 5
          We need to take a half-hour break if we could. We'll
 6
     come back probably about 45, a half hour to 45 minutes.
 7
     Which would you prefer, a half hour or 45 minutes?
 8
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
 9
               MS. CARLYON: Tell us a time, and we'll be here.
10
                THE COURT: Okay. A quarter of, then, sound good?
               MS. CARLYON: Thank you, your Honor.
11
12
               UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, your Honor.
13
                THE COURT: Okay. There's a --
14
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
15
                THE COURT: -- cafeteria downstairs. There's a
16
     couple across the street.
17
           (Colloquy not on the record.)
18
                THE CLERK: All rise.
19
           (Recess at 12:59:05 p.m.)
20
           (Thereupon, the portion requested to be transcribed
21
          was concluded at 12:59:05 p.m.)
2.2
23
24
25
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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
1
      from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in
 2
 3
      the above-entitled matter.
 4
 5
 6
      /s/ Lisa L. Cline
                                                         11/01/06
     Lisa L. Cline, Transcriptionist
 7
                                                           Date
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